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NEXT GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
A RESPONSE TO RICHARD STEWART
DANIEL C. ESTY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Richard Stewart's paper, A New Generation of Environmental
Regulation?, provides a comprehensive and insightful tour of U.S.
environmental regulatory history. 1 Professor Stewart also surveys a range
of new approaches to environmental law that have been brought forward
under the auspices of regulatory reform efforts over the last several
decades. 2  He discusses in considerable detail how these "second
generation" tools work and the contexts in which particular strategies are
likely to be successful. 3 He delves into a number of the reasons why
regulatory reform efforts have not succeeded in recent years and closes
with a set of interesting views on how to encourage movement toward a
more refined environmental regulatory structure.4
Much of what Professor Stewart suggests makes eminent sense. I will
focus, therefore, on two areas where I think the Stewart analysis can be
broadened and deepened, perhaps leading to a more optimistic result than
Stewart's conclusion about the prospect for an improved structure of
environmental law and better ecological and public health results over
time. In particular, I believe that Professor Stewart overlooks the
transformative power of the "information" revolution.
II. POINTS OF AGREEMENT
Professor Stewart makes the case for environmental regulatory reform
in a sweeping and convincing fashion. He notes that our current system
both over-regulates and under-regulates. 5 Furthermore, it delivers less in
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1 Richard Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation? 29 CAP. U. L.
REv. 21 (2001).
2 See id. at 38-94.
3 See id. at 38-94.
4 Seeid at 27-38, 151-82.
5 See id at 28.
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the way of results for more money than is necessary.6 The inefficiency of
the existing environmental policy structure has resulted in tremendous
burdens on both the regulated community and society in general. 7
Increasingly, this neglect of economic costs and policy choices has
become a source of real strain. Stewart argues (and I agree) that the fact
that many parts of the system defy any sense of decision-analysis
rationality represents a significant threat to the long-term public
commitment to environmental protection. 8 Indeed, one of the clear
conclusions from the "Next Generation" Environmental Policy Reform
Project I organized at Yale Law School was that the public broadly
supports environmental protection but wishes to see a good return on the
investments made in pollution control and natural resource management. 9
Thus, the durability of environmental programs depends critically on the
regulatory regime delivering good value for the money put into it.
Professor Stewart also observes (correctly in my opinion) that what
constitutes the optimal environmental governance structure will evolve
over time. 10 Circumstances change, and so too must environmental
protection strategies. In the early stages of development when regulatory
capacity is low, command-and-control regimes may well be optimal
insofar as they can be constructed in ways that minimize the
administrative burden on the government. As jurisdictions move along the
regulatory learning curve, they will often find that more sophisticated and
nuanced approaches to environmental challenges will be possible, yielding
improvements in both effectiveness and efficiency. 1 I
Although Professor Stewart does not stress the point, his wide-ranging
discussion of the many environmental policy tools and strategies that have
6 See id at 30-31.
7 See Donald E. Elliot, Quality Environmental TQM: Anatomy of a Pollution
Control Program that Works!, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 1840, 1846-48 (1994) (listing the
inefficiencies and social costs inherent to traditional "government standard setting").
8 See Stewart, supra note 1, at 30.
9 For this finding and other elements of the multi-year Yale study, see THoNKiNG
ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PoucY (Marian R. Chertow &
Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997) [hereinafter THInKING ECOLOGICALLY].
10 See also Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1495, 1501-02 (1999) (observing that moving toward optimal environmental
governance is a dynamic process that may involve passing through several stages over
time) [hereinafter Esty, Environmental Governance]; Daniel C. Esty & Marian R. Chertow,
Thinking Ecologically: An Introduction, in THIIJNG ECOLOGICALLY, supra note 9, at 4-5
(discussing the need for a generational perspective on environmental policy and
recognizing that the programs which may have been appropriate in the past will often not
be the most useful today or in the future).
11 See Esty, Environmental Governance, supra note 10, at 1501-02.
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been used or considered makes clear that optimal regulatory systems will
include multi-pronged strategies relying on different types of regulatory
tools. 12 The diversity of ecological and public health challenges that fall
under the environmental rubric makes an equally diverse regulatory
response an absolute necessity. 13
"A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?" also walks
through both the theory and practice of environmental fees and taxes, trade
in pollution "residuals" through systems of defined quotas or allowances,
transferable development rights, risk bubbles, and other market
mechanisms designed to address environmental problems. Stewart
effectively highlights the limitations of the traditional command-and-
control approaches, and he provides a series of useful case studies that
demonstrate the potential gain from economic incentive approaches. 14
One of the hallmarks of the environmental domain is its complexity
and the high degree of uncertainty that plagues regulators. 15 As our
knowledge base expands, there are constant opportunities to refine and
improve our regulatory systems. Stewart emphasizes, in this context, the
value of "reflexive law." 16 I share his enthusiasm for environmental
regulatory approaches that are iterative and adaptive. In the face of great
uncertainty, learning from experience and engaging in a process of
"continuous improvement" is essential. In addition, there exists a great
potential to use the -regulatory regime to engender broader cultural changes
in attitudes towards the environment. 17 To the extent that environmental
values are inculcated in societal norms, the need to design robust
12 See Stewart, supra note 1.
13 See E. Donald Elliott, Foreword: A New Style of Ecological Thinking in
Environmental Law, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 16-19 (1991) (noting a healthy legal
system must be as diverse as a healthy ecosystem).
14 See Stewart, supra note 1, at 34.
15 See J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTON CONTROL IN THE UNITED
STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM 29-30 (1998) (noting that scientific uncertainty induces
the EPA and Congress to use economic, political, administrative, or technological criteria
in policymaking); Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislating Inaction: Asking the Wrong Questions
in Protective Environmental Decisionmaking, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 327, 333-38
(1991) (describing the types of and the extent of scientific uncertainties that environmental
regulators face).
16 See Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1252-
57 (1995) (outlining a theory of reflexive environmental law that emphasizes learning and
improvement throughout the life of regulatory regimes); see also Esty, Environmental
Governance, supra note 10, at 1502.
17 See E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?, 41 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 595, 602 (1997) (describing "copying and transmission" of cultural norms through
statutory law).
2001]
HeinOnline -- 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 185 2001-2002
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
enforcement procedures will be reduced. Individual or business instincts
will converge with environmental goals.
III. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Professor Stewart's discussion of next generation environmental
regulation begins with a review of a number of efforts to increase the
rationality and flexibility of the existing regulatory system. He analyzes
in some detail the various efforts that have been launched in recent years
to emphasize a combination of cost/benefit analysis and risk/benefit
calculations as a foundation for regulatory decisionmaking. 18 He also
walks through several less overt but no less important bureaucratic
accommodations that have served to soften the hard edges of
environmental law-providing what Farber calls "slippage" 19 and what
others have simply suggested is "common sense."'2 0 Professor Stewart
also surveys a number of recent attempts to "contract" around rigidities in
the current regulatory system. 2 1  Describing these initiatives-habitat
conservation plans, brownfields redevelopment efforts, the EPA's XL
(Excellence and Leadership) Program, supplemental environmental
projects in EPA enforcement actions, and wetlands mitigation and
banking 22-as "formalized" slippage, Stewart understates the potential of
these regulatory innovations. In fact, I think that a good bit more can be
18 See Stewart, supra note 1, at 39-54. See also DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-
PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 47-
60 (1999) [hereinafter ECO-PRAGMATISM] (arguing that while cost-benefit analyses are not
the ideal means of making environmental policy, they are useful starting points); Daniel A.
Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, Later
Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REv. 267, 272-77 (1993) (explaining
critically the role of cost-benefit analysis in environmental policymaking); Jay Michaelson,
Rethinking Regulatory Reform: Toxics, Politics, and Ethics, 105 YALE L.J. 1891, 1911-25
(1996) (critiquing the EPA's cost-benefit risk assessment in policymaking).
19 See generally Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and
Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (1999)
(discussing the concept of slippage).
20 To learn about the EPA's "Common Sense Initiative," see their Web site at
http://www.epa.gov/commonsense.
21 For an up-to-date review of the potential gains from and limitations of
environmental contracting, see ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES
TO REGULATORY INNOVATIONS IN THE US AND EUROPE (Kurt Deketelaere & Eric Orts eds.,
forthcoming 2000).
22 See Dennis D. Hirsch, Bill and Al's XL-Ent Adventure: An Analysis of the EPA's
Legal Authority to Implement the Clinton Administration's Project XL, 1998 U. ILL. L.
REv. 129, 130-46 (1998) (describing Project XL); see generally Walter E. Mugdan, EPA's
Role in Brownfields Redevelopment, SE55 ALI-ABA 75, (Feb. 9, 2000).
[29:183
HeinOnline -- 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 186 2001-2002
2001] A RESPONSE TO RICHARD STEWART 187
done with environmental contracts in the future, as I will discuss below.2 3
What is most interesting about Stewart's analysis of the various efforts
to improve the rationality of the current system is his discussion of why
these innovations have met with such limited success. Stewart observes
that in many cases the initiatives have been launched without solid
statutory foundations. 24 The EPA's XL Program, for example, has clearly
been stymied by a fear that any flexibility provided by the EPA would, in
effect, be "extra-legal," and therefore vulnerable to collateral attack by
other parties who might not share EPA's sense of the benefits to be gained
through an XL contract. 2 5 Similarly, Stewart notes, the prospect of
judicial review has undermined a number of attempts to promote greater
cost/benefit and risk analyses in the regulatory process. 2 9 For example,
the possibility that inadequate cost/benefit calculations by the EPA might
be subject to legal challenge by regulated industries has struck fear in the
hearts of environmentalists. I think that Stewart has correctly identified
the narrow issue of fear (in some cases from the industry side and in other
cases from the environmental side) created by new opportunities for
judicial review, but he fails to make a perhaps more important, broader
point. Notably, the "legalism," or perhaps more pejoratively the legalistic
nature of American environmental law, has become a major drag on the
process of evolution toward more efficient and effective regulatory
structures.2 7 In part this litigious tradition is a function of American
culture.2 8 But the stasis produced by fear of legal attack derives as well
23 See also B. John Ovink, Sustainable Development and the Use of Covenants in
Environmental Legislation, 4 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L L. 207, 227-33 (1995) (describing the
advantages derived from the Dutch Environmental Management Act, which, in part, gives a
statutory basis to environmental covenants between the central government and the private
sector); Susan Ridgley, Environmental Protection Agreements in Japan and the United
States, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 639, 649-52 (1996) (describing how Japan has used
environmental contracts to fill gaps in regulatory authority, to assign collective
responsibility, and to manage transboundary pollution).
24 See Stewart, supra note 1, at 61-63.
25 See Thomas E. Caballero, Project XL: Making it Legal, Making it Work, 17
STAN. ENvTm. L.J. 399, 412-38 (1998) (describing Project XL's legal problems and
recommending that the EPA propose a statute to give it legal authority to implement
Project XL); Hirsch, supra note 22, at 146-72 (outlining the problematic implementation of
Project XL and suggesting that the agency use "implied waiver authority" to implement it).
26 See Stewart, supra note 1, at 68, 83-84.
27 See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International
Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2045 (1993) (noting "the U.S. should seek to reduce
the excessive costs and burdens imposed by its exceptionally rigid, legalistic system of
environmental law and administration").
28 See generally David M. O'Brien, "The Imperial Judiciary:" Of Paper Tigers and
(continued)
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from the particular history of environmental law, which built on the "civil
rights" model of landmark legislation that established new social goals
that were in turn enforced by confrontational nongovernmental
organizations pressing test cases.2 9 This model of social change has had
its day, but must be seen now as potentially counterproductive. 3 U
Another reason that these regulatory reform efforts have made little
progress can be traced to the fact that there has been a great deal more
emphasis placed on tabulating costs than on carefully calculating the
benefits of regulatory interventions. Although good economists know
how to handle non-market values and other uncertainties that arise in the
process of doing cost/benefit analyses,3 1 many tend to dismiss what
cannot be seen or quantified as unworthy of being recognized explicitly.
Rather than working to refine cost/benefit and risk/benefit methodologies,
however, environmental advocates have broadly taken to condemning
these tools altogether.3 2 Unfortunately, this leaves the environmental
community with little in the way of a rational alternative for
policymaking.
Other environmental advocates have taken the opposite tack. Instead
of dismissing cost/benefit analyses, they have sought to torque the
results. 33 While the regulated community will often exaggerate the costs
of a proposed regulatory program, 34 understating industry's capacity for
Socio-Legal Indicators, 2 J.L. & POL. 1, 1-10 (1985).
29 See Gerald Torres, Changing the Way Government Views Environmental Justice,
9 ST. JoHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 543, 545 (1994) ("The argument is that we observe these
identifiable communities being disadvantaged by being made to carry a greater
environmental burden than other communities. That distribution of burdens offends the
constitutional principal of equality or the principal of equality that is found in the
applicable civil rights statutes.").
30 See generally Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Quality as a National Good in
a Federal State, 1997 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 199 (1997) (arguing that differences in
environmental protection across localities are not only legally permissible but desirable
insofar as different localities have different endowments).
31 See Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100
YALE LJ. 1211, 1214 (1991) (explaining that market and non-market approaches interrelate
in several significant ways).
32 See generally Daniel C. Esty, What's the Risk in Risk?, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 603
(1996).
33 For example, see the description of the Natural Resource Defense Council's
controversial risk assessment on the use of the pesticide ALAR on apples in Timur Kuran
& Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REv. 683,
698-702 (1999).
34 See Richard D. Morgenstern & Marc K. Landy, Economic Analysis: Benefits,
Costs, Implications, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT THE EPA: ASsESSrNG REGULATORY IMPACT
(continued)
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innovation and adaptation, some environmentalists have generated sloppy
studies that wildly inflate the benefits of regulatory intervention, using
dubious methodologies, such as contingent valuation, to make a political
point.3
5
In reviewing the limitations of environmental agreements, Stewart
notes that legitimate concerns about proposed regulatory reforms have
been raised. He suggests that there are important questions that must be
answered about who participates in the environmental policy process,
what information is brought to bear, how rules are crafted and what
monitoring and compliance mechanisms are put in place)6 Stewart
acknowledges that some of the opposition to the "first generation and a
half" regulatory reform strategies has emerged because of the efforts of
certain political forces to launch a "blanket override" of the current
environmental regime.3 7 But he glides too quickly past the fact that a
number of regulatory reform initiatives have had hidden deregulatory
agendas embedded within them. In some cases, the deregulation
advocates legitimately seek greater efficiency and economic growth. 3 8
But in other cases, the deregulation thrust appears to have been
engendered by a desire to advance certain special interests within the
regulatory context. 39  The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act4 0 stands out as one example. Exempting small businesses
from environmental requirements may make for good politics, but it does
not improve the rationality of regulatory results. To the contrary, this act
and others that have advantaged small businesses tend to perpetuate a
462 (Richard D. Morgenstem ed., 1997) (noting interested parties may use statements
about costs out of context to lobby against new regulations).
35 See Donald J. Boudreaux, Roger E. Meiners & Todd J. Zywicki, Talk is Cheap:
The Existence Value Fallacy, 29 ENVTL. L. 765, 780-83 (1999) (arguing the non-
simultaneous nature of contingent valuation surveys that ask non-experts to consecutively
price natural resources-e.g., Yellowstone Park, the Costa Rican rain forests-prompts
respondents to overvalue resources, because they cannot consider the values of the
individual resources relative to each other).
36 See Stewart, supra note i, at 38-94.
37 Id. at 47.
38 See Michael Evan Stem & Margaret M. Mlynczak Stem, A Critical Overview of
the Economic and Environmental Consequences of the Deregulation of the US. Electric
Power Industry, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 79, 101-04 (1997) (describing the theoretical justifications
for deregulation).
39 See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, Pollution and Federalism, in CONTROLLING
ENviRONMENTAL POLICY: THE LIMrTS OF PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES
137-56 (1995) (arguing that the Reagan era devolution initiatives really represented
deregulation in support of business interests).
40 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1996).
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system that focuses attention only on the "big dirties." 4 1 But we know
today that a good bit of the residual environmental harm that our nation
faces is a function of individually small but cumulatively large emitters,
including small business such as bakeries, dry cleaners, and gas
stations.4 2
Professor Stewart's discussion of economic incentive systems again
provides an excellent survey of the various market mechanisms that are
available to pursue environmental goals. He assesses with great care the
strengths and weaknesses of these tools and strategies, providing
important insights on the contexts in which particular mechanisms are
likely to be most effective. 4 3
Stewart's analysis of the reasons why economic incentive-based
systems have penetrated so little into the environmental regulatory regime
over the last twenty-five years is also illuminating. He notes that in too
many cases, incentive strategies have been ineffective. 4 4 For example,
environmental taxes have often been set at levels too low to change
behavior.4 5 He recognizes that competitiveness fears have often led
jurisdictions to tread lightly in the market mechanism realm for fear of
disadvantaging their own industries in increasingly competitive inter-
jurisdictional markets. Stewart also observes that any change in policy
creates losers and winners and that the losers often have a considerable
incentive to resist new regulatory approaches. 4 6 In the environmental
realm, ironically, the potential "losers" in a new system represent a set of
rather odd bedfellows: businesses whose current emissions are "permitted"
and not fully paid for through cost-internalizing market mechanisms;
environmental groups who are invested in campaigns that depend on the
current portfolio of problems to attract public support; agency bureaucrats
whose skill sets and relative power derives from the current structure of
harms and regulatory approaches; and congressional committee members
and staffs whose capacity to generate media attention and public interest is
41 See Esty & Chertow, supra note 10, at 2 (commenting that the next generation of
environmental regulation must not overlook the thousands of small businesses that
collectively produce large amounts of pollution).
42 See id.
43 See Stewart, supra note I, at 99-134.
44 See id. at 11l7.
45 See Nathaniel 0. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz & Robert N. Stavins, The Choice
of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 367
n. 16 (1998) (noting that European Pigouvian taxes have been too low to reduce pollution).
46 See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The
Federalization of Environmental Law, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985) (highlighting the
asymmetries between cost-bearers and beneficiaries of environmental regulation).
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a function of their established expertise within the existing system.
4 7
Stewart notes that the politics of environmental reform are further
complicated by the regressiveness of many cost-internalizing policies.
The prospect of shifting from "hidden" environmental costs in a
command-and-control system to explicit pollution fees in a market-driven
mechanism also runs afoul of the "no-new-taxes" mantra that dominates
the thinking of America's political class. The fear of change and the
discounting of the benefits of anything new add to the difficulty of moving
beyond the status quo.4 8  Stewart also observes that the potential
complexity of market approaches to environmental regulation serves as a
significant deterrent to change. Moreover, the transition costs that would
have to be incurred in establishing a new regulatory regime provide an
additional obstacle.
To the Stewart list of "political economy" problems that regulatory
reform efforts must overcome, I would add several additional items. First,
the political logic of under-regulation is often overwhelming, and may be
the reason why the current system, despite its recognized poor
performance, persists.4 9 Notably, to the extent that the current command-
and-control structure does little to address inter-jurisdictional spillovers of
pollution harms, the system provides a systemic bias toward under-
regulation. 5 0 In addition, politicians have high discount rates, giving
little, if any, weight to costs or benefits that occur after the next election
cycle.5 1 Thus, they are very happy to have regulatory systems that
impose a minimum of burdens today even if this generates costs that must
be borne at some point in the future in the form of unaddressed
environmental harms.
Second, Stewart underattends to two critical dimensions of the
environmental challenge: uncertainty 52 and the inescapable clash of
47 See generally Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political
Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TuL. L.
REv. 845 (1999) (arguing that diverse groups including industries, environmental interest
groups, politicians, regulators, and lawyers, have incentives to prefer the status quo
command-and-control regime to decentralized alternatives).
48 See Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 18, at 277-87 (explaining the concept
of discounting and the difficulty of choosing the optimum social discount rate).
49 See Kirsten H. Engel, Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and is
It "To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGs L.J. 271, 297-305 (1997) (explaining the theoretical
bases for under-regulation).
50 See WiLLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATs, THE THEORY OF ENviRONmENrAL
PoLicY 14-35 (2d ed. 1988) (defining and discussing unintemalized externalities).
51 See generally Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 570 (1996).
52 See Flournoy, supra note 15.
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values in the regulatory domain. 53 The high degree of uncertainty in
environmental decisionmaking--the sources of harm, the fate and
transport of pollutants, ecological and epidemiological effects of particular
exposures, the scale of the injuries, and the lack of clarity about options-
all contribute to a powerful bias towards inertia. To some extent,
environmental problems depend on critical value assumptions that are
quintessentially political. 54 How much value to place on a human life or
a pretty view cannot be determined in any scientifically authoritative
manner. As a result, some of the disputes that have stymied reform efforts
really are reflective of underlying debates over environmental values. 5 5
Stewart also pays little attention to the structural bias of our political
system in favor of the status quo. The political science literature is rich
with discussions of the difficulty of bringing about change within the
American political system and the concomitant ease with which blocking
coalitions can be assembled. 5 6  The tendency towards inaction is
exacerbated by the fact that, as Stewart notes, much of the change has the
flavor of movements towards Kaldor-Hicks efficiency but not Pareto
optimality.5 7 Thus, while the winners gain more than the losers lose,
everyone is not better off as a result of reform.5 8 And there has been too
little emphasis on finding ways to ensure that the winners compensate the
losers and therefore facilitate evolution of the system. 59
53 See Esty, Environmental Governance, supra note 10, at 1547-79 (noting public
choice failures in the environmental regulatory domain); Richard B. Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667, 1684-87, 1713-15
(1975) (noting asymmetries between industry goals and regulatory agencies' protection of
public interests).
54 See Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5
YALE J. ON REG. 89, 134-47 (1988) (arguing the EPA should augment scientific with social
policy judgments); Mark Sageoff, The Principles of Federal Pollution Control Law, 71
MrNN. L. REv. 19, 24-44 (1986) (describing several moral bases for environmental
regulation); Peter H. Schuck & Robert E. Litan, Regulatory Reform in the Third World:
The Case of Peru, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 51, 77 (noting that reformers often wrongly assume a
culture's values mirror their own).
55 See Esty, Environmental Governance, supra note 10, at 1518-20.
56 See, e.g., Douglas W. Rae, Political Democracy as a Property of Political
Institutions, 65 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 111, 115 (1971) (formally demonstrating how "veto
groups" lead to undemocratic results).
57 See Jules L. Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical
Review of Richard Posner's The Economics of Justice, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1105, 1106-12
(1982) (book review) (describing the difficulties in justifying Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).
58 See Calabresi, supra note 31, at 1222-23 (discussing the gap between Kaldor-
Hicks and Pareto superiority).
59 See Carol M. Rose, Property Rights and Responsibilities, in TMINiG
(continued)
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There are, however, some examples where the skids of environmental
reform have been greased to positive effect. Most notably, the 1990 Clean
Air Act acid rain control program not only shifted the regulatory model to
a tradable allowance system, but it also provided "bonus allowances" for
Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, where the "losers" from the new system were
heavily concentrated. 60 Similarly, Carol Rose suggests that more liberal
compensation for regulatory takings might facilitate enhanced
environmental standards in ways that environmentalists are hesitant to
recognize. 6 1  Getting the winners to compensate the losers in the
environmental domain has proven to be especially complicated because
the "losers" are often polluting entities whose moral standing is low in the
minds of some elements of society.62 Environmentalists, for instance,
ask; "Why should bad actors be compensated for stopping their socially
harmful activities? Isn't this," they ask, "like requiring society to
compensate smokers who are now forced to huddle outside the doorways
of buildings in order to enjoy their vice?"
IV. THE UNREALIZED OPPORTUNITY: INFORMATION STRATEGIES
The problems identified above in moving towards more effective and
efficient environmental approaches can be addressed by greater emphasis
on information and knowledge development within the regulatory system,
a realm in which our capacity is rapidly growing. Professor Stewart
touches lightly on market-based information strategies, but he then
dismisses these approaches as unworkable as a foundation for a new
generation of environmental law. He argues that too often information
that is both accurate and concise cannot be provided to consumers. 63 He
adds that the market evidence suggests that consumers will not pay a
premium for environmentally superior products. 64  Similarly, he
concludes that most investors pay little attention to environmental
performance as a predictor of economic success. 6 5 Finally, he argues that
it would be normatively inappropriate to set environmental goals through
ECOLOGICALLY, supra note 9, at 54-55 (describing the transition costs that new
environmental regulations impose).
60 See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE
L.J. 931, 981-82 (1997) (noting that the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act were the
key to bypassing a historical reluctance to increase regulation among Midwestern
Congressmen).
61 See Carol MA Rose, Property Rights and Responsibilities, in THINKING
ECOLOGICALLY, supra note 9, at 53-57.
62 See id.
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the marketplace on the basis of an aggregation of individual market
preferences. 6 6
I believe that Stewart has misjudged the transformative potential of
the "Information Age." I see three fundamental ways in which the
expanded capacity for information management and our growing
knowledge base will permit us to move towards improved environmental
results at ever lower costs.
A. Reducing Direct Regulatory Costs
There are a number of cases, as Stewart acknowledges where
information-driven regulatory strategies have yielded success.61 EPA's
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) mandates that certain businesses provide
data on their emissions to the land, air, and water.6 8 Although there is no
substantive requirement that these emissions be reduced, the mere fact that
companies have to report their pollution levels to the public-not to
mention the considerable media and public attention that the annual
release of TRI data generates-has led to a focus by many corporations on
finding ways to eliminate toxics from their production processes. 6 9
Similarly, California's Proposition 65, which mandates labeling of
products that present a threat of carcinogenicity or reproductive harm, has
resulted in the transformation of a vast number of products that once
contained harmful chemicals. 7 0 Driven by the California requirements,
lead has been removed from the solder that seals tuna fish cans. "White-
Out" corrective fluid has been reformulated to eliminate a chlorinate
solvent, which is a potent carcinogen.7 1 The list of actions taken to avoid
Prop 65 liability or the posting of a warning label is very long.
72
66 See id.
67 See id at 139-40.
68 See David J. Abell, Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know: The
Toxics Release Inventory, 47 SMU L. REv. 581, 582-83 (providing a statutory overview of
the TRI).
69 See id. at 588-90 (describing the successes of the TRI).
70 See Michael Barsa, California's Proposition 65 and the Limits of Information
Economics, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1223, 1239-42 (1997) (proposing a "consciousness-raising"
paradigm for evaluating Proposition 65 and explaining the incentives businesses have to
clean up their production processes).
71 See Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings Under
California's Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303, 341-48 (1996) (noting this
reformulation and the reformulations of other consumer products, including reducing lead
in ceramic plates, removing toluene from nail polishes, and removing lead from
submersible water pumps).
72 For a discussion of the marketplace's reaction to Proposition 65, see David Roe,
An Incentive-Conscious Approach to Toxic Chemical Controls, 3 ECON. DEv. Q. 179
(continued)
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The value of putting information into the hands of decision makers has
also been demonstrated by the EPA's Green Lights Program. 73 The
potential for improved energy efficiency (and therefore reduced pollution
from power generation) in lighting has been understood for decades. But
in the early 1990s, the EPA found a way to get corporations and other
institutions in society to act on this information. Through its "Green
Lights" program, the EPA engaged corporate executives in the challenge
of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by drawing the attention of top
management to lighting practices. The EPA transformed the decision
about what kind of light bulbs to use and how often to change them from a
decentralized matter left to facilities managers and janitors into an issue of
high corporate strategy to which senior executives paid attention. As a
result, thousands of corporations have transitioned from incandescent
bulbs to more energy-efficient fluorescent ones.
7 4
The potential for regulation based on enriched information and better
data foundations far exceeds these preliminary results. Consumers are
also a focus of these information strategies. In a small number of
countries, eco-labels now steer green-conscious consumers to
environmentally superior products. 75 In the United States, eco-labels
have yet to catch on. With the ever-falling cost of information, it will
increasingly become possible for consumers to get information on the
environmental impact of the products they are considering purchasing.
76
As the search costs for environmental information go down, the number of
consumers willing to take environmental variables on board as part of
their decision process will go up. The Internet also promises to reduce
information and search costs, including costs in generating and
distributing environmental information. 7
7
(1989).
73 See EPA, GREEN LIGHTs: AN ENLIGHTENED APPROACH TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY
AND POLLUTION PREVENnON (1993).
74 For more information on the EPA's Green Lights Program, see their Web site at
http://www.epa.gov/greenlights.
75 See JAMES SALZMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL LABELING IN OECD CouNrRIES 28-31,
43-70 (1991) (discussing the effectiveness and inner workings of existing eco-label
regimes).
76 For example, see the Web sites of Natural Logic at http://www.natlogic.com and
Environment Support Solutions at http://www.environ.com for lists of environmentally
friendly vendors and products.
77 See Peter S. Menell, Structuring a Market-Oriented Federal Eco-information
Policy, 54 Mo. L. REV. 1435, 1439 (1995) (noting that the US government has not adopted
a comprehensive labeling plan but that some private groups have sponsored small-scale
labeling initiatives); see also James Salzman, Informing the Green Consumer: The Debate
Over the Use and Abuse of Environmental Labels, 1 J. IND. ECOL. 11 (1997).
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B. Information-Driven Improvements in Economic Incentive Systems
Most economic incentive approaches to regulation build on the
possibility of harnessing market forces to an environmental goal. 7 8
Environmental taxes work because pollution externalities are internalized,
forcing producers or consumers to pay attention to the environmental costs
they are inflicting on society-at-large. 79  Emissions trading regimes
function because the allowances established create an incentive for efforts
to reduce emissions at every level of pollution releases. 80 In both cases,
the chance to drive environmental outcomes through market forces
depends significantly on the degree of information available. For
Pigouvian 8 ' taxes to work, there must be a calculation made as to how
high the fees should be set. To be fully appropriate, this policy approach
demands a significant degree of knowledge about the environmental harm
being addressed and some important calculations about how to value this
harm. To the extent that we are moving into an era that will be more data-
rich than today, we should be better positioned to construct cost-
internalizing taxes. Likewise, a tradable permit "market" depends on
buyers and sellers having a degree of information about how much it will
cost to meet control obligations without trades-and some degree of
information about the availability and cost of permits as an alternative to
undertaking pollution mitigation activities.
82
Risk "bubbles" also depend on a greater degree of information than is
generally currently available. 83 If we are to permit facilities to reduce
78 See Keohane, Revesz & Stavins, supra note 45, at 314 ("At least in theory,
market-based instruments minimize the aggregate cost of achieving a given level of
environmental protection, and provide dynamic incentives for the adoption and diffusion of
cheaper and better control technologies."); Norman W. Spaulding III, Commodification and
Its Discontents: Environmentalism and the Promise of Market Incentives, 16 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 293, 294 (1997) ("Market-based approaches may make possible faster and more
tangible environmental rewards.").
79 See Jurgen G. Backhaus, The Law and Economics of Environmental Taxation:
When Should the Ecotax Kick In? 19 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 117 (1999) (describing how
environmental taxes differ from classical revenue taxes).
80 See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?:
Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 289, 325 (1998) (discussing in detail how emissions trading regimes work).
81 A.C. Picou, THE EcoNoMIcs OF WELFARE 172-203 (4th ed. 1948).
82 See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Control
Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative
Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887, 895-97
(describing an ideal world in which tradable permits would be completely efficient).
83 See generally E. Donald Elliott & Gail Charnley, Toward Bigger Bubbles: Why
(continued)
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risks across the array of harms that are present, we must have a clear
picture of the pollutants that are being emitted and the risks that they pose.
We must also have some knowiege about the fate and transpui of the
various chemicals or metals and how these might be affected.
Historically, the level of information that would be necessary to create a
risk bubble system that is effective might well seem overwhelming. 8 4 In
particular, the degree of real-time monitoring that would have been
required to ensure that the system was not being manipulated would have
seemed like an insurmountable obstacle. Today, however, with advanced
pollution detection and tracking equipment, the technical dimension of the
risk bubble problem is becoming increasingly tractable.8 5
Better information also supports reflexive environmental law. Over
time, as we are able to move towards a regulatory regime that imposes
more complete cost internalization on industry, the value to companies of
undertaking their own environmental management systems (the European
Union's EMAS or ISO 14000) will increase. 86 Currently, companies
have little incentive to go "beyond compliance" because they are taking on
burdens that are costly, whereas their competitors may be emitting waste
out of smoke stacks or effluent pipes without bearing the full cost for the
harm they inflict on society. 87 If a company knows that its competitors
will not be able to get away with cost externalization, they will not fear a
competitive disadvantage from being environmentally well-behaved.
Thus, we can expect that the number of companies participating in
environmental management systems and finding value in being certified
under a regime such as ISO 14000 will grow over time.8 8 Similarly, the
link in the minds of the investment community between good
environmental management and good economic performance is likely to
Interpolutant and Interrisk Trading Are Good Ideas and How We Get There from Here, F.
APPLiED REs. & PuB. POL'Y 48, (Winter 1998) (addressing and rejecting objections to
regulatory bubbles that cite the impossibility of measuring and comparing different
environmental risk reductions).
84 See id. at 50 (noting that determining the optimal size of risk bubbles requires
accurately monitoring many intangible variables).
85 See id. at 51 (describing the "easy cases" where implementing bubbles would be
efficient).
86 See Dick Hortensius & Mark Barthel, Beyond 14001: An Introduction to the ISO
14000 Series, in ISO 14000 AND BEYOND (Christopher Sheldon ed., 1997).
87 See Daniel C. Esty & Michael E. Porter, Industrial Ecology and Competitiveness,
2 .. INDus. EcOLOGY 35, 35 (1998) (noting polluting companies may have a competitive
advantage if a regulatory regime leaves costs uninternatlized).
88 See Amy Pesapane, ISO 14000 and Environmental Cost Accounting: The
Gateway to the Global Market, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 501, 528-30 (1998)
(describing why companies will participate in ISO 14000).
2001]
HeinOnline -- 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 197 2001-2002
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
become clearer as information becomes available to demonstrate this link
and, more importantly, as more sophisticated regulatory approaches ensure
that firms that are emitting waste are called to account for their cost
externalization. 8 9
Another way that improved information will transform the regulatory
process and facilitate economic incentive systems is by making reliance on
environmental property rights more feasible. 9 0  Professor Stewart
dismisses "free-market environmentalism" as unrealistic and dependent on
extreme optimism. 9 1 If, however, the holders of environmental rights had
full information about the value of their resources, and the transaction
costs of negotiating the purchase and sale of these rights were negligible,
then a free market for environmental resources would produce efficient,
welfare-maximizing and just outcomes. While pollution would not be
eliminated, there would be no unintemalized environmental harms. Thus,
we would find ourselves, at least in theory, with optimal levels of
pollution. The level of information about harms, causal effects,
epidemiological and ecological impacts, and options for adaptation and
mitigation would clearly need to be very high to ensure a fully-
functioning, free market approach to the environment. Nevertheless, as
the level of information and knowledge rises-as it seems certain to do
over the coming decades-the degree to which the market for
environmental rights can become a more significant element of our
environmental protection system is likely to grow.92 And while the
movement toward a Coasian world of bargaining over environmental
rights and performance remains limited as an answer to environmental
challenges, the capacity to manage complex information means that the
assumption that such a system only works when there are "small numbers"
may be relaxed to some degree. 93
More fundamentally, an information-rich environmental realm would
help to address or even to eliminate some of the obstacles that have held
back progress on second generation approaches to environmental law.
89 One major effort that links success in business with good environmental
stewardship is the Dow Jones Sustainability Group Index, available at
http://www.sustainability-index.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2000); see also Andrew King &
S. Baerwald, Using the Court of Public Opinion to Encourage Better Business Decisions,
in BETTER ENvmoN m'NTAL DEcisioNs: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNMENT, BUsTNESS, AND
CommatnIWES (K. Sextos et al., eds. 1998) (arguing that better environmental stewardship
on the part of businesses could improve their public esteem).
90 See Esty, Environmental Governance, supra note 10, at 1541-43 (examining
regulatory gains from better information).
91 See Stewart, supra note i, at 167-69.
92 See Esty, Environmental Governance, supra note 10, at 1506.
93 See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. I (1960).
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Improved modeling of environmental behavior will facilitate, in particular,
more refined and effective market mechanisms. For example, as our
knowledge base grows, we are likely to be more successful in setting tax
rates that more precisely internalize environmental harms. Similarly, to
the extent that the Internet and other information technologies lower the
cost of contracting around environmental rigidities, the price of regulatory
reform drops. Likewise, as the Internet creates new markets, we may see a
range of economic incentive approaches-particularly small-scale
allowance trading schemes-that previously were thought to be too
difficult to carry out in practice.
While environmental policy interventions are still likely to create
winners and losers, the public choice failures that currently plague
environmental debates in Congress and within our state legislatures may
also be reduced in the Information Age that lies ahead. 94 Specifically, the
degree to which special interests will be able to manipulate the political
and regulatory process without being noticed is likely to diminish. The
vast array of information about who is exercising influence over
policymaking and increased capacity to track the political activity of
lobbyists and other special interest peddlers will narrow the zone of
regulatory manipulation.
More broadly, improved environmental technologies will provide a
capacity for sophisticated and low-cost monitoring that makes economic
incentive systems more attractive. The 1990 Clean Air Act's 95 acid rain
trading program would not have been conceivable without twentx-four
hour a day, seven-day a week smokestack monitoring of emissions.9 6 In
the future, our capacity to track a variety of emissions-from toxic
releases to vehicle emissions to greenhouse gases-will become much
more refined.9 7 With more information on who is causing what harms,
society will be able to implement environmental tax regimes with a degree
of sophistication and confidence that is currently not available. More
information would also facilitate regulatory approaches such as wetlands
banking and mitigation that depend on careful tracking of environmental
94 See Esty, Environmental Governance, supra note 10, at 1548-49 (noting that the
opacity of environmental regulations precludes the public from judging regulatory success
and enables interest groups to exert undue influence).
95 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1990).
96 See Cole & Grossman, supra note 82, at 921-22 (noting smokestack monitoring
technology made implementing the Clean Air Act possible).
97 The scientific literature is rich with examples of monitoring technologies. See,
e.g., E.J. Hinsta et al., SPADE H20 Measurements and the Seasonal Cycle of Stratospheric
Water Vapor, 21 GEoPHYSIcAL REsEARCH LrTs 2559 (1994); C.R. Webster et al.,
Quantum Cascade Laser Measurements of Stratospheric Methane (CH4) and Nitrous
Oxide (N20), APPLIED OPTIcs (submitted December 1999).
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burdens and the success of "alternative" performance. With good
information on what kinds of wetlands are being harmed, for instance, and
data on where mitigation can be undertaken, the public could have much
greater confidence in a regulatory approach that relies on off-site wetlands
protection and creation.
Perhaps more critically, GIS mapping of wetlands (and endangered
species habitats) will soon make it possible to have a complete picture of
environmentally sensitive areas available for the public.9 8  Before
developers eye (and purchase) a parcel of land, they will be able to check
whether they will face future environmental difficulties. This information
will mean many fewer wetlands "surprises" and a much higher degree of
predictability about what projects will be approved.99
Fundamentally, our capacity to manage ever-increasing amounts of
information and data makes managing complex systems less burdensome
and more cost-effective. Errors of over-simplification, which plague our
environmental regulatory system today, could be dramatically reduced. In
addition, an improved technical and scientific knowledge base will narrow
the zone of uncertainty in which political judgment about environmental
policy goals and strategies is required. By reducing the scope of what is
"art" (as opposed to science) in environmental debates, we will be able to
narrow the range over which political judgment must be exercised. 10 0 In
doing so, we will reduce the depth of the current political divide that
makes today's environmental politics so polarized.
Information strategies will not fix all of the problems that stymie
movement toward greater use of next generation environmental policy
tools. There will remain a political challenge arising from the fact that
many of our environmentally-unsound policies (such as less-than-full-
price gasoline or cheap food made possible by subsidized agriculture)
provide the limited degree of support for the poor within the American
context. 10 1 To undo these income-redistributing subsidies in support of
environmental rigor would be regressive. Of course, with enough political
98 See Dennis D. Murphy, Fulfilling the Promise: Reconsidering and Reforming the
California Endangered Species Act, 35 NAT. RESouRCES J. 735, 767 (1995) (noting GIS
mapping will help identify gaps in protection networks).
99 Note that comprehensive information about wetlands and endangered species will
make reasonable investment-backed expectations about developing ecologically sensitive
areas a thing of the past. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992); Loveladies Property Owners Ass'n v. Raab, 430 F.Supp. 276 (D.N.J. 1975), af'd,
547 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1976).
100 For a table illustrating this point, see Esty, Environmental Governance, supra
note 10, at 1519.
101 See Richard J. Lazarus, Fairness in Environmental Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 705, 725-
26 (1997) (noting the regressive tendencies of environmental law).
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will, one could execute a tax shift that permits full cost internalization of
environmental harms while providing targeted tax relief through carefully
constructed fiscal policies.
But even with a more information-rich policy realm, irrational fears of
revenue neutral tax shifts will be hard to overcome. While there are many
ways to rebate the funds that might be generated from cost-internalizing
environmental fees, skepticism about whether the government would
actually give back as much money as it takes in remains rampant. 10 2
Almost certainly, those who receive the rebates would not be the same
ones who are paying increased fees because of their emissions, making
such redistributive policies vulnerable to attack by those who find
themselves worse off.
The core political economy problems of the environmental realm are
also hard to redress simply through improved information. The structure
of cost-bearers and beneficiaries in the environmental domain is such that
the polluters are often concentrated and have much to gain by intervening
in the political process to preserve a policy system that does not fully
internalize environmental harms. 10 3  The beneficiaries of market
mechanisms, the vast public that currently bears a small degree of burden
from uninternalized harms, are very hard to motivate in the political arena.
Nevertheless, the Information Age may reduce the degree of public
choice failure as people are educated about the asymmetry of interests in
the environmental realm and disclosure strategies make clear who is
influencing the political process. 104
The transition costs of moving from the current system to one that is
much more market-oriented will also be impossible to eliminate. But if
the costs of training and education go down due to the presence of new
tools such as the Internet, the transition period can be reduced and the
process of getting people up to speed on the new approaches can be
streamlined. The "network effects" which lock people into the current
regime can be broken down to the extent that more people are aware of the
benefits of new regulatory approaches and become comfortable with
them.1 0 5
The high discount rates of the political class in the United States (and
everywhere else for that matter) will also be hard to change. So long as
102 See GREEN LEDGERS: CASE STUDIEs IN CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTING
(Daryl Ditz et al. eAds., 1995).
103 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REV. 713, 727-
28 (1985) (discussing the congressional influence of special interests).
104 See Esty, Environmental Governance, supra note 10, at 1547-49.
105 For discussions of "network effects" see Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics
of QWERTY, 97 AM. ECON. ASS'N. PAPERS & PROC. 332 (1985); Steve Lohr, Business
Often Goes to the Swift, Not the Best, N.Y. TImEs, Aug. 6, 1995, §4, at 3.
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politicians are elected for fixed-year terms, they have a strong incentive to
ensure that the burdens imposed on taxpayers during their term of office
are minimized, and they have a big incentive not to address problems that
will impose costs over time, especially if the issue can be ignored with
little negative impact in the short run. 106 But while the spreading of
burdens to those in the future who are not currently around to complain
will be hard to mitigate, a richer flow of information that makes clear
when harms are being spread temporally as well as spatially can help to
reduce the policy failures that arise from spillovers of pollution onto
omitted voices and the parallel mismanagement of common resources. 10 7
C. Transformative Nature of the Environmental Challenge
The Information Age and the rapid advances that are occurring in
science promise to transform the nature of our environmental challenge.
To the extent that a high degree of uncertainty plagues good
environmental policymaking, the prospect of better data, clearer
environmental indicators, and more sophisticated cost-benefit and risk
analyses, makes the promise of a higher decree of rationality in addressing
environmental challenges a reasonable bet. Increasingly, it will not be just
governmental decision makers who are positioned to make better choices;
the business community and individuals in their roles as environmental
actors will also be better positioned to understand and ultimately to reduce
the harms they inflict on society in the coming years.
More profoundly, in a number of instances information may be
substituted for activities that cause pollution or the squandering of scarce
resources. For example, as microchip-driven thermostats replace
traditional heating and cooling controls (which are either on or off),
furnaces and air conditioners will only be triggered into operation when
people are present and in need of cooling or heating. 10 8 In effect, the
more sophisticated thermostat substitutes information for energy, thereby
reducing the amount of fuel that is burned and the pollution that is
generated. The now-controversial subject of genetically modified
organisms provides another area of great environmental promise. If the
full potential of genetically modified crops were to be realized, crops
might be able to be grown with much less in the way of fertilizers and
nutrients, and perhaps even with less water. 109 Again, information in the
106 See Esty, Environmental Governance, supra note 10, at 1514 (discussing
politicians' "high discount rate").
107 See RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEoFFs IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener eds., 1995).
108 Honeywell Inc. has growing markets in programmable thermostats. See their
Web site for details at http://www.honeywell.com/yourhome.
109 See Daniel C. Esty, Trade Storms, WORLD LINK, May-June 2000, at 12-3.
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form of genetic interventions facilitates a reduction in environmental
damage.
A more information-rich world would also permit greater
"individualization" of environmental policy. Currently, because
individual susceptibility to pollution exposures varies, we over-regulate
with regard to some individuals and under-regulate with regard to others.
The enormous administrative costs of carrying out environmental policies
and regulatory decisionmaking drives us to use gross averages. I10 With
future improvements in science, monitoring and tracking equipment, and
data-gathering and manipulation capacities, environmental policies will be
more finely tailored. We may at some point be able to track individual
increments of harm being emitted from a smokestack or effluent pipe to
specific individuals who suffer harms. This level of detail would permit
not only a much more efficient regulatory system of cost internalization,
but also a much fairer system where individuals are compensated for the
harms they actually suffer instead of the average rate of injury for the
community as a whole.
The Internet and other information technologies that are just emerging
will also facilitate the processes of industrial ecology.1 11 Increasingly,
waste streams from one industry will be available to others for whom
these flows might be useful as inputs to their own production processes.
While there are limits to how far these flows can be optimized and loops
closed, there is a great deal of potential industrial symbiosis that is
currently not cost effective due to high search costs and the lack of
markets to facilitate the requisite exchanges. The Internet makes possible
the creation of new markets in these products with low transaction
costs. 1 12 Thus, companies which are today paying to have their waste
taken away may soon find that they can give their by-products away at
cost to someone who will re-use them, or perhaps even charge for their
waste streams, having identified someone who has a need for the very
materials that they are trying to unload.
More generally, the Information Age permits systemic thinking.
There will be a much greater capacity in the world at large and the
regulatory community in particular for careful risk analysis and for
benefit-benefit comparisons. To the extent that the trade-offs among
110 See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Rulemaking, 3
J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 262 (1974); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative
Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 74 (1983).
III See THOMAS E. GRAEDEL& B.R. ALLENBY, lNI)usTRIAL ECOLOGY 110-14 (1995)
(describing the industrial ecology flow cycle, through which one firm's waste may be
recycled into another firm's raw material to avoid the problems of waste disposal).
112 See BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD 18 (1995) (noting that the Internet virtually
eliminates the need for face-to-face communication).
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environmental opportunities and challenges are better understood,
improved natural, resource management and pollution control outcomes
are likely.
Improved tracking and information systems would also facilitate
movement to more careful environmental stewardship on the part of
environmental industry. In effect, information makes environmental
harms more visible, and it is clear that the public and the corporate world
respond much more quickly and effectively to challenges that are plain to
see.
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Stewart has provided us with an extraordinary retrospective
on the modem American system of environmental regulation. His paper
offers a series of insights on how we might move to a second generation of
environmental law. But I believe that the Second Generation's day has
already come and gone. We must think immediately how to get to the
Next Generation of environmental law and policy, facilitated by the
enormous growth in our knowledge and capacity made available by the
Information Age.
[29:183
HeinOnline -- 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 204 2001-2002
